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Abstract 
This paper looks at how the Dutch General Old-Age Pensions Act impacts the 
distribution of equivalent lifetime income, using a dynamic cross-sectional mi- 
crosimulation model. Considering both vertical and horizontal redistributional 
effects, the paper shows that lifetime redistribution is considerably smaller than the 
redistribution measured on the basis of a period approach. The horizontal lifetime 
redistribution is more important than the vertical one, but this effect is rather 
limited, in particular due to the increasing premium percentages in combination with 
the regressive nature of the contribution levying. 
Keywords: Income redistribution; Public pensions; Microsimulation 
JEL classification: D31; H55 
I. Introduction 
Treat ing income and income (re)distribution in a particular year is 
generally accepted to be too simplistic a view (for example,  Pestieau, 1989; 
Klevmarken ,  1983; and Atkinson,  1983). Doing so fails to take account of 
changes in, for example,  the population structure, the labour marke t  
structure,  and so on. As a consequence,  an annual analysis differs f rom a 
lifetime analysis. We see, therefore,  a growing interest in intergenerational  
redistribution, an approach,  however,  which is hampered  by the absence of 
sufficient (longitudinal) data. All available studies in this field (for an 
overview, see Nelissen, 1994, ch. 2) have strong limitations: they look only 
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at the cohort 's  average (e.g. Moffit, 1982), or limit themselves to some 
income categories or to a number of hypothetical family types (see Ferrara 
and Lot,  Jr., 1985; Nelissen, 1987; and Boskin et al., 1987). The reason for 
this is that these studies cannot take account of the (larger part of the) 
socio-economic environment;  they can only take into account the scheme 
under  consideration and, if possible, some demographic forecasts. 
I propose to overcome this limitation by using a microsimulation ap- 
proach,  which will make it possible to follow one or more generations using 
(most of) the relevant information with respect to the socio-economic 
environment .  The microsimulation approach has not often been used in this 
area. Comparable  studies have been applied only to proposals (Wolfson, 
1988, and Wagner,  1984), whereas a steady-state approach can be found in 
Harding (1993) and Falkingham et al. (1993). 
This paper  will examine the lifetime impact of old-age state pensions. 
Social security aims to redistribute income in order  to maintain, or to reach, 
a certain level of existence. This relates to the consumption possibilities of 
the households in question. Therefore ,  this paper will not emphasize the 
effect of the old-age pension on the income distribution, but rather its effect 
on consumption possibilities via equivalent lifetime income. To reach that 
goal, the paper  employs the microsimulation model NEDYMAS,  a dynamic 
cross-sectional microsimulation model that takes into account the changes in 
populat ion structure, labour force participation, income developments,  and 
so on. Actually, this analysis, with respect to the lifetime redistributional 
aspects of the Dutch General  Old-Age Pensions Act (from now on to be 
referred to as the AOW) ,  is the first one that opts for a longitudinal 
approach applied to an existing scheme. 
After  presenting a short overview of the AOW, the paper then describes 
the microsimulation model and discusses the main elements that determine 
the redistributive impact of the A O W  (Section 3). The simulation results 
will be shown in Section 4. Section 5 covers the effect of using equivalent 
income and shows the intra-personal and intra- and intergenerational 
income streams via the AOW. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. The old-age state pension (AOW) in the Netherlands 
Since 1 January 1957 the A O W  has insured all Dutch residents between 
the ages of 15 and 65 years old, and has provided them with an old-age 
pension beginning from the age of 65. The pension is financed by a 
pay-as-you-earn system. Those insured pay a premium; roughly speaking, 
this includes people aged between 15 and 65. Every resident in The 
Netherlands is insured and can build up an annual 2% of his or her old-age 
state pension, irrespective of income. The premium was a percentage of the 
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so-called p remium income up to 1990. In 1989 this p remium percentage 
amoun ted  to 10.8% and had to be paid up to an income of (at most)  Dfl. 
65,900. Since 1990, the A O W  premiums have been incorporated in the tax 
system. For  that purpose,  the tax rate in the so-called 'first income tax 
group '  (all taxable income above the basic tax a l l o w a n c e - D f l .  4,568 
generally in 1990 -  up to a maximum of Dfl. 42,123 (1990) above the basic 
allowance) consists of  two parts: 13% general revenue and 22.1% (1990) 
social security contributions, of which 14.30% has been reserved for the 
AOW.  An important  point is that the contribution is limited to the 'first 
income tax group' .  This implies that the revision, at the contribution side, 
was ra ther  regressive. In 1994 the percentage is 14.25%, which is levied on a 
max imum of Dfl. 43.267 plus the basic allowance (generally Dfl. 5,925). 
Table  1 presents the data. 
Unlike the contributions, benefits are flat-rated. The net benefit equals 
the net minimum wage for marr ied and cohabiting couples, whereas non- 
marr ied  and non-cohabit ing persons receive 70% of this amount .  The 
amounts  are Dfl. 1,779.96 and Dfl. 1,240.08, respectively, per  month  in 
1994. Before  1 April  1985, marr ied women who had reached the age of 65 
were ,  in general,  not allowed to claim an old-age pension. Their  claims were 
included in those of their husbands. After  1 April 1985, all persons,  upon 
reaching the age of 65, were granted benefits, with only few exceptions. As 
of 1 April  1985 the benefit for a marr ied person was 50% of the amount  for 
a marr ied  couple. If  the par tner  of the person receiving the pension was 
younger  than 65 years old, then the pension was adjusted depending on the 
Table 1 
Premium percentages and annual ceiling for the AOW 
AOW Ceiling Ceiling 
(%) (Dfl.) (in 1990 prices) 
1960 5.5 7,450 26,450 
1965 8.7 12,000 34,860 
1970 9.5 17,450 41,830 
1975 10.4 31,750 49,900 
1980 10.25 46,400 54,920 
1985 11.7 63,200 60,590 
1989 10.8 65,900 67,580 






Sources: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken (1989) and Nelissen (1993). 
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partner 's  income (as of 1 April 1988). Another  change, introduced in 1985, 
was that both the husband and wife had t o  pay the A O W  contribution 
separately,  up to the maximum premium income, whereas before their 
premium incomes were totalled together and the A O W  contribution was 
levied on this sum (up to the maximum premium income). 
Further  information on the A O W  can be found in Nelissen (1993, 1994). 
The structure of the Dutch old-age state pension implies, among other 
things, the following redistributional aspects: 
(a) because of the PAYE financing, the specific contribution rates are 
dependent  on the population structure, so that changes in this structure lead 
to intergenerational transfers. The 'greying' of the population is an im- 
por tant  aspect in this; 
(b) before the revision of the law in 1985, couples had only to pay 
contributions up to the (individual) maximum premium income; this implies 
a redistribution from unmarried to married people; 
(c) the differences in mortality rates between men and women cause a 
redistribution from men to women; 
(d) because the term of insurance has not been linked to premium 
payments,  and because higher-educated persons start working at an older 
age than do lower-educated persons, there is, at least to some degree, a 
redistribution from lower-educated persons to higher-educated persons; 
(e) the labour force participation of women is lower than men's,  and 
becomes lower the higher the number of children; this also implies a 
redistribution from men to women and, moreover ,  a redistribution from 
families with no children or a limited number of children, to families with a 
large number  of children; 
(f) the temporary provisions (made in 1957), in order to overcome the 
problems with respect to the insurance duration, favour the generations 
born  before 1942, and consequently imply an intergenerational redistribu- 
tion. 
3. The  micros imulat ion  model  N E D Y M A S  ~ 
N E D Y M A S  is a dynamic cross-sectional model. Dynamic microsimula- 
tion comes initially from the ideas of Orcutt; see Orcutt  et al. (1976, 1986). 
An overview of the ins and outs of the microsimulation approach, especially 
with respect to social policy, can be found in Citro and Hanushek (1991). 
The dynamic approach implies that demographic processes are explicitly 
simulated, which means that the size of the micro database changes during 
the simulation period. The sample passes through time, year by year. For 
NEDYMAS stands for NEtherlands DYnamic Micro-Analytic Simulation model. 
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(eg 19871 {eg ;988) (e 9 1989) 
Fig. 1. The principle of microsimulation. Source: Hellwig (1988). 
each person in the micro database, one examines which personal charac- 
teristics change, and to what extent,  each year. The principle of microsimu- 
lation is shown in Fig. 1. To illustrate this, I will use the modelling of 
mortality.  The decision of whether  an individual will or will not undergo a 
potential  transition, is simulated with the aid of the Monte Carlo method.  In 
view of this, the conditional probability of an individual undergoing that 
event  has to be given. For  example, for a 77-year-old widowed woman, the 
probabili ty of dying was 6.75% in 1968. We then randomly draw a number  
f rom the uniform [0, 1] distribution. If this number  is smaller than or equal 
to 0.0675 (the probability of dying) the woman is expected to die. If the 
number  is larger than 0.0675, the women is expected to remain alive. If she 
dies, we then check to see if she had dependent  children (who have become 
orphans).  So, decisions (or events) in the life of an individual can have 
implications for other  individuals. Microsimulation creates a synthetic 
database which reflects the (developments in the) demographic and econ- 
omic structure of the population. A stylized example is given in Table 2. 
At  the heart  of microsimulation modelling is its state representat ion of the 
components  of the system of interest. To execute this representation, first 
draw up a list of attributes for each individual in the sample. Next,  after the 
adaptat ion of a micro-representation,  specify an initial population. It would 
have been preferable to use a real sample of individuals and households 
along with their attributes. However ,  such a sample is not available. A 
usable sample can be derived from the 1947 Census data; see Nelissen 
(1991, 1994). So, the model simulates all events from 1947. Each year, the 
characteristics of the individuals (and thus the households) are updated,  if 
necessary. The modules, which are used in the current version of 
N E D Y M A S ,  and the sequence of treatment,  are given in Table 3. 2 Like 
all microsimulation models, N E D Y M A S  is a recursive model. First, all 
demographic transitions are made in the model. Next,  education is consid- 
ered,  and thereafter  changes in economic activity, with the resulting 
labour income. Finally, the income transfers and taxes are modelled. The 
2 An extensive description can be found in Nelissen (1991, 1993, 1994). 
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Table 2 
An example of microsimulation 
1986 (sample data) 1987 (aged data) 
ID Age Sex Job Income ID Age Sex Job Income 
Household 1 Household 1 
P1 1 47 M Yes 38,000 P1 1 48 M Yes 
P2 2 44 F No 0 P2 2 45 F No 
P3 3 20 M Yes 23,000 P3 4 16 M No 
P4 4 15 M No 0 
Household 2 Household 2 





21 M Yes 25,000 
19 F No 0 
H o u s e h o l d 3  Househo ld3  
P1 6 37 M Yes 32,000 P1 6 38 M Yes 
P2 7 38 F No 0 P2 7 39 F Yes 
P3 8 18 F No 0 
Household 4 Household 4 
35,200 
14,175 
Notes: Pi = ith person in the household. ID = identification number. 
Source: Hellwig (1988). 
simulation model  is not able to simulate nonlabour income because it does  
not contain a module  for private consumption.  So, savings cannot be 
determined,  and, as a consequence ,  neither can wealth or income from 
wealth.  Therefore,  the analysis is limited to the redistributive impact of  the 
social security system on lifetime labour income.  Because  the model  does  
not  contain a module  for capital income,  the taxes are imposed only on 
wages  and social security income.  This means,  of  course,  that only a part of  
all tax transfers is considered. Moreover ,  the model  is not able to take full 
account  of  the redistributive impact, via public funding, of  the schemes  
under consideration.  Therefore,  the model  limits itself to the redistributive 
impact of  social security benefits and of  social security contributions and 
does  not consider contributions from general revenue.  This implies that 
about  10% of  the financing side of  the social insurances is left aside; because 
the A O W  does not receive contributions from public funds, however ,  this 
omiss ion  creates no problem for this scheme.  
The various transition rates are based on observations,  if available. 
H o w e v e r ,  especially for the period 1947-1965, additional assumptions had 
to be made.  The future demographic transition rates are based on the 
forecasts of  the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. The transition 
probabilities,  with respect to the education submolecules ,  are held constant 
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Table 3 
Programme module sequencing for each individual in NEDYMAS 
435 
A. Demographic module 
1. Immigration 
3. Old people's home 
5. Marriage 
7. Child custody 
9. Cohabitation selection 
11. Splitting-off children 
B. Labour and income module (first part) 
12. Education 
14. Income percentile 
16. Transitions from school 
18. Transitions from military service 
20. Transitions from being unemployed 
22. Retirement 
C. Social security module 
24. Private pension premiums 
26. Deduction civil servants 
28. Widowers state pension benefits 
30. Family allowances 
32. Sickness insurance benefits 
34. Disability pensions civil servants 
36. Unempl. benefits civil servants 
38. Unemployment provision benefits 
40. Provision older and partly disabled 
employees 
43. Health insurance contributions 
45. Unemployment insurance contributions 
47. Widowers state pension contributions 
49. Family allowances contributions 
51. Contributions civil servants pension fund 





8. Dehabitation a 
10. Fertility 
13. Scholarship 
15. Labour supply 
17. Transitions from disablement 
19. Transitions from being employed 
21. Transitions from the state houseman/ 
housewife 
23. Labour income 
25. Pension premiums for civil servants 
27. Old-age state pension benefits 
29. Widow, widower and orphan pensions for 
civil servants 
31. Disability state pension benefits 
33. Disability insurance benefits 
35. Old-age pensions for civil servants 
37. Unemployment insurance benefits 
39. Supplementary benefits 
41. Social assistance benefits 
42. Sickness insurance contributions 
44. Disability insurance contributions 
46. Old-age state pension contributions 
48. Disability state pension contributions 
50. Exceptional medical expenses 
contributions 
a This paper uses the term 'cohabitation' only for people living together without being 
married. If they decide to dissolve their consensual union, we speak of 'dehabitation'. 
a t  t h e  1988 l e v e l ,  w h e r e a s  f u t u r e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  in t h e  f ie ld  o f  l a b o u r  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a n d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a r e  b a s e d  on  f o r e c a s t s  o f  t h e  D u t c h  
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  Soc ia l  A f f a i r s .  I t  wil l  be  a s s u m e d  h e r e  tha t  n a t i o n a l  i n c o m e  
has  an  a n n u a l  g r o w t h  o f  2 % .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  it s h o u l d  be  n o t e d  t h a t  f r o m  
1991 o n w a r d s  t h e  soc ia l  s ecu r i t y  p r e m i u m s  w e r e  d e t e r m i n e d  e n d o g e n o u s l y  
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on the basis of simulated benefits and income. A comparison of simulated 
data with real data can be found in Nelissen (1991, 1993). 
The purpose of this study is to gain more insight into welfare distribution. 
Thus the model will have to take into account the consumption possibilities 
of households and to consider welfare differences between various types of 
households. To make the welfare positions of households, which differ in 
size and composition, comparable, equivalent income must be used. For 
that purpose we use the results of Diederen (1983), who applies an 
empirical-subjective approach. 3"4 The equivalence scale is applied to each 
income component  and the sum of all the equivalent income components is 
imputed each year to each individual in the household unit. This implies that 
the income measure takes full account of the variance in household 
circumstances by attributing the standard of living of the household to each 
individual residing in that household. For a further discussion, see Harding 
(1993, pp. 51-55). Lifetime income (or benefit, or contribution) is measured 
by the sum of the (discounted) annual equivalent income (or benefit, or 
contribution) amounts. 
4. The simulation results 
To determine the redistributional effects of the AOW, we look at the 
following: (1) the average lifetime wage and the average benefits from and 
contributions to the A O W ;  (2) the effect of the A O W  premiums and 
benefits on the Theil coefficient; (3) the contribution of the A O W  benefits 
and premiums towards income per decile; and (4) the benefit- tax ratio per 
decile. These four elements are given for the cohorts born in the years 
1930-1935 (called cohort 1930), 1936-1945 (cohort 1940), 1946-1955 
(cohort 1950) and 1956-1965 (cohort 1960). 
The income components have been adjusted for household composition 
(via the equivalence scale) and the resulting amounts have been adjusted for 
changes in the price index and discounted to 1990, using a discount rate of 
3 Economists disagree on this issue and on which equivalence scale should be used. Research 
in the field of lifetime redistribution inclines towards the application of equivalence scales; I will 
come back to this issue in my evaluation. With respect to the choice of the equivalence scales, it 
holds that other scales (e.g. empirical-objective methods) do not lead to other conclusions. Of 
course, the exact figures differ, but the direction of the results does not. See, for a discussion, 
Coulter et al. (1992). 
4 Here a single adult counts for 0.70. Two adults count for 1.00 and each subsequent adult 
adds 0.30 to this value. The value for a child depends of its age and the number of children in 
the household. The average values are 0.11 (children below the age of six years old), 0.15 
(children aged six to 11 years) and 0.20 (children aged 12-17 years). 
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2 % ,  which  is rough ly  the  rea l  in te res t  r a te  in the  N e t h e r l a n d s  dur ing  the  last  
cen tu ry .  T h e r e f o r e ,  the  ne t  benef i t  can be  c ons ide r e d  as the  rea l  gain  f rom 
the  sys t em or ,  in the  t e r m i n o l o g y  of  B u r k h a u s e r  and  War l i ck  (1981) and  
Wol f f  (1991),  as the  t rans fe r  c o m p o n e n t  of  the  scheme(s)  u n d e r  cons ide ra -  
t ion .  
M o r e o v e r ,  pe r sons  who  were  invo lved  in mig ra t ion  have  b e e n  e x c l u d e d  
f rom m y  ca lcu la t ions .  T h e  ca lcu la t ions  are  based  on  ten  runs  wi th  a d i f fe ren t  
set  o f  r a n d o m  n u m b e r s ,  all s ta r t ing  with  a micro  d a t a b a s e  of  10,58 pe r sons  
in the  y e a r  1947. T h e  s imula t ion  runs  to the  yea r  2060. Thus  the  b i r th  
g e n e r a t i o n s  1930 up  to  1960 can be  fo l lowed  a lmos t  c o m p l e t e l y ,  wi th  r e spec t  
to  the i r  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  life h is tory .  5'6 The  r ed i s t r ibu t ive  impac t  has  b e e n  
m e a s u r e d  via  c o m p a r i s o n  with the  gross  wages ,  because  no  da t a  exist  to 
s imu la t e  a wor ld  in which  g o v e r n m e n t  is absen t .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  it is a s sume d  
tha t  the  b u r d e n  of  benef i t s  (con t r ibu t ions)  is fully inc iden t  u p o n  the  pe r son  
w h o  rece ives  (pays)  the  benef i t  ( con t r ibu t ion) .  This  fo l lows s t a n d a r d  p rac t ice  
in m a j o r  inc idence  s tudies ;  see  R e y n o l d s  and  S m o l e n s k y  (1977) and  Ce n t r a l  
S ta t i s t ica l  Office (1990).  
T h e  s imu la t i on  resul ts ,  wi th  r e spec t  to l i fe t ime wages ,  social  secur i ty  
benef i t s  and  con t r ibu t ions ,  a re  g iven in T a b l e  4. E q u i v a l e n t  l i fe t ime gross  
wages ,  inc lud ing  e m p l o y e r s '  con t r ibu t ions  ( h e r e a f t e r  ca l led  e m p l o y e r s '  gross  
wages ) ,  a re  on  ave rage  Dfl. 3,148,500 for  the  cohor t  1930, Dfl. 3,466,700 
( coho r t  1940), Dtt.  3,721,700 (cohor t  1950) and  Dfl. 3,719,300 (cohor t  
1960). T h e  ne t  benef i t s  7 f rom the  social  secur i ty  sys tem a m o u n t  to  Dfl. 
430,300 for  c o h o r t  1930 (be ing  13.7% of  the  gross  wages) ,  and  dec l ine  
r a t h e r  r ap id ly  to  Dfl. 297,700 for  cohor t  1960 ( 8 . 0 % ) .  R e m e m b e r ,  h o w e v e r ,  
t ha t  p a r t  of  the  gain  fol lows f rom con t r ibu t ions  via  publ ic  funding  ( abou t  
10% of  the  benef i ts ) .  T a k e  these  con t r ibu t ions  in to  account ,  and  the  va r ious  
coho r t s  still  ga in  f rom the  sys tem.  This  gain  is caused  by  i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  
5 In 2060 only 0.8% of the persons born in the year 1960 and about 5% of those born in 1965, 
will still be alive. No account has been taken of income and contributions after 2060. 
6 The average number of persons per run, involved in the simulation, amounts to 923 for 
cohort 1930, 1667 for cohort 1940, 2297 for cohort 1950, and 2363 for cohort 1960. Because ten 
runs have been used, this implies that for cohort 1930, for example, the calculations are based 
on about 9200 individual life histories. 
7 Define net benefits as the lifetime sum of equivalent social security benefits received minus 
the lifetime sum of equivalent social security benefits paid. Because the AOW is financed via 
the PAYE system and no general revenues are involved, the net benefit from the AOW is partly 
determined by the application of equivalence scales and for the rest it has been paid by younger 
cohorts. Cohorts born after 1975 show a large net AOW loss. For the total social security net 
benefit, it holds that a (rather constant) part of the funding (about Dfl. 120,000 for each cohort) 
comes from tax revenue, which is not included in the simulation. Because our emphasis is on 
the redistributive aspects of the AOW, the lack of general revenue has no effect on the 
conclusions. The aspect of the use of equivalence scales is discussed further in Section 5. 
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Table 4 
Lifet ime equivalent  wages and social security benefits and premiums;  mean  and s tandard 
deviat ion (in thousands  of Dfl., 1960 prices) 
Cohort  Cohort  Cohort  Cohor t  
1930 1940 1950 1960 
Mean  S.D. Mean  S.D. Mean S.D. Mean  S.D. 
Wages  incl. employers '  
contr ibut ions 3148.5 93.3 3466.7 56.0 3721.7 49.9 3719.3 76.8 
Employers" contr ibutions 244.9 5.0 260.6 4.0 276.2 7.8 259.0 12.9 
Employees '  contributions 337.1 7.7 446.5 10.5 573.6 5.0 705.7 26.4 
of  which A O W  166.5 3.3 209.2 3.1 261.0 3.3 326.1 4.3 
Benefi ts  1012.3 23.7 1125.5 18.6 1177.8 16.3 1262.4 19.5 
of which A O W  369.0 9.9 365.0 6.8 341.7 8.0 344.1 9.6 
Net  benefit 430. 3 17. 0 418.4 8.1 328.0 12.0 297. 7 21.7 
of  which A O W  203.5 8.2 155.8 6.2 80.7 6.3 18.0 7.2 
S.D. = Standard deviation. 
transfers, especially via the AOW. But persons born after about 1970 will, 
on average, suffer a loss. 
The A O W  contributions and benefits form an important part of the net 
benefit. The contributions equal 28.6% of the total social security contribu- 
tions paid by cohort  1930, and amount  to 33.8% for cohort  1960. The 
percentages for the A O W  benefits are 36.5% and 27.3% of the total social 
security benefits, respectively. The equivalent net A O W  benefit amounts to 
Dfl. 202,500 for cohort 1930 and declines to Dfl. 18,000 for cohort  1960. So, 
the decrease in the net A O W  result is larger than the decrease in the net 
benefit  for the combined social security schemes. This decrease is caused by 
the large increase in the A O W  contributions, a consequence of the 'greying' 
of the Dutch population (see Table 1). The (equivalent) A O W  benefits 
hardly differ between generations. 
The net A O W  benefit, subdivided by sex, marital status, employment  
status at age 45, number  of children and level of education, is shown in 
Table 5. With respect to marital status, the following are distinguished: (a) 
unmarried persons who have never cohabitated during their life; (b) persons 
who have been (re-)married or have been living together and have not 
separated during their last union; and (c) persons who were once married or 
once cohabited and who have separated, but did not remarry or recohabit  
afterwards. They are indicated by single, married and separated, respective- 
ly. Employment  status has been measured as the situation at the age of 45 
years (if alive) or the status in the year of death, if deceased before the age 
of 45 years. The following distinctions are made: (a) employees in private 
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Table  5 
The  net  equivalent  A O W  gain (in thousands  of Dfl., 1990 prices) decomposed by sex, marital  
s ta tus ,  employmen t  status,  numbe r  of  children and level of  education 
Cohor t  1930 1940 1950 1960 
Total  204 156 81 18 
By sex 
(a) male 107 71 - 5 "  - 5 4  b 
(b) female  304 244 163 91 
By sex and marital  s tatus 
(a) single men  35 a 27 a - 1 3  b - 6 9  b 
(b) marr ied men  120 80 8 ~ - 4 0  b 
(c) separa ted  men  79 62 6 a - 6 7  b 
(d) single women  219 162 79 43 
(e) marr ied  women  316 253 176 112 
(f) separa ted  women  284 237 173 86 
By sex and employment  status 
(a) male  employees  110 70 - 1 2  a - 5 6  b 
(b) male  civi lservants  89 62 a - 4 2  b - 9 9  b 
(c) self-employed men  100 428 -21a  _88 b 
(d) male  nonworkers  130 105 68 30 
(e) female employees  286 232 145 76 
(f) female civi lservants  - - 110 43 
(g) self-employed women  301 229 160 86 
(h) female nonworkers  309 252 178 117 
By n u m b e r  of children 
(a) 0 children 123 77 18 - 2 7  b 
(b) 1 child 169 136 71 15 
(c) 2 children 206 155 97 37 
(d) 3 children 215 175 107 43 
(e) 4 children 237 208 107 60 
By level of  educat ion 
(a) lower educat ion 216 168 90 35 a 
(b) 1st stage secondary general  educ. 216 157 104 46 
(c) junior  vocational training 183 149 46 7 a 
(d) 2nd stage secondary general  educ. 205 159 100 36 
(e) senior vocational training 206 170 95 34 a 
(f) vocational colleges 205 148 73 - 5  a 
(g) university 122 110 36 -204  
a Not  significantly differing from 0 (a = 0.05). 
b Significantly less than  0 (a = 0.05). 
firms and persons who became unemployed or disabled from this state; (b) 
civil servants and persons who became unemployed or disabled from this 
state; (c) persons who were self-employed at the age of 45; and (d) all other  
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persons (e.g. housewives, housemen, early-disabled persons, unemployed 
school-leavers, but also unemployed persons who were once self-employed). 
These groups are called employees,  civil servants, self-employed persons 
and nonworkers,  respectively. 
The  A O W  forms a large part of the total gain for women from the social 
security system, which is, of course, related to the longer life expectation for 
women.  Women receive, on average, Dfl. 145,000 (cohort 1960) to Dfl. 
197,000 (cohort 1930) more than men. The net result for men is even 
negative in the youngest two cohorts, which implies that the contributions 
are larger than the benefits. So, the A O W  redistributes income from men to 
women.  
With respect to marital status, single men pay most, followed by 
separated men. The net result is significantly negative in the youngest cohort  
for  all male groups. On average, married women receive the most among 
females and single women receive the least. 
With respect to the employment  status at age 45, nonworkers benefit most 
f rom the AOW. This is mainly because they contribute less than the other  
three groups do. Among men, employees have the second largest gain, and 
nonworkers  have the smallest loss, whereas among women, self-employed 
persons and employees receive about the same net result. Civil servants are 
the worst off: they have the lowest net gain c.q. the highest net loss for both 
men and women. The cause of this is the higher income of civil servants, 
which implies higher contributions. 
With respect to the number  of children, it can be seen that the net gain 
increases, the larger is the number of children. This is partly related to the 
equivalence scales applied, but it is also a consequence of the effect of 
household composition on labour supply, which in turn affects the claims for 
various social security schemes. The net gain, by level of education, is 
roughly higher, the lower the level of education. The A O W  is especially 
beneficial to the educational groups (a), (b), (d) and (e), whereas those who 
finished vocational colleges or have a university degree always receive less 
than the average, in net terms. 
Table 6 reports on the lifetime redistributive impact of the Dutch social 
security system, as measured by the Theil coefficient. The Theil coefficient 
for employers '  gross wages, that is to say before social security, is 0.161 for 
cohort  1930, 0.133 for 1940, 0.125 for 1950, and 0.116 for 1960. This shows 
that income inequality decreases quickly in the course of time. 
Social security benefits result in a decrease in the income inequality, 
whereas contributions have a regressive effect. The income inequality 
enlarging effect of contributions is larger, the younger the cohort. The Theil 
coefficient for lifetime wages minus social security contributions amounts 
to 0.181 for cohort  1930 and 0.141 for cohort 1960. So, the contribu- 
tions increase income inequality by 12.3% and 21.8%, respectively. The 
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Table 6 
Lifetime redistributive impact of social security benefits and contributions (Theil coefficients 
and procentual differences with respect to the Theil coefficient for employers' gross wages) 
Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort 
1930 1940 1950 1960 
Theil coefficient 
(1) Employers' grosswages 0.161 0.133 0.125 0.116 
Changes in Theil coefficient [per cent deviation from (1)] 
(2) Benefits -35.3 -35.5 -32.5 -36.6 
AOW -16.4 -15.0 -12.4 -12.7 
(3) Contributions 12.3 14.2 16.1 21.8 
AOW 5.2 6.0 7.0 9.3 
(4) Net benefits -26.2 -26.7 -22.1 -24.8 
AOW -13.0 -10.8 -7 .4  -6.1 
regressive effect is caused by the existence of a maximum premium income. 
The increase is due to the smaller premium income limit, as introduced by 
the tax reform in 1990. 
The benefits result in an equalizing effect; the Theil coefficients for 
lifetime wages plus social security benefits are about 35% smaller than those 
for lifetime wages. The AOW benefit has a proportionally large effect, 
diminishing income inequality by 16.4% for the oldest cohort and 12.7% for 
the youngest cohort. The AOW contributions lead to an enlargement of 
income inequality. Thus the AOW contributions cause the Theil coefficient 
to increase by 5.2% for cohort 1930, 6.0% for 1940, 7.0% for 1950 and 
9.3% for 1960. 
Thus, both the benefits received and the contributions paid determine the 
net impact. All social insurances together reduce income inequality by 26% 
for cohort 1930, 27% for 1940, 22% for 1950 and 25% for 1960. The decline 
in income inequality in the course of time, as a consequence of the social 
security system, is comparable with the developments in the Theil coefficient 
for employers' gross wages, albeit somewhat less. It is striking that the 
reduction in income inequality by the social security system hardly differs 
between cohorts. The AOW forms an important part in this equalizing 
effect, but its role is decreasing. The net equalizing impact of the AOW 
amounts to 13.0% in the oldest cohort (which is about half the total equal- 
izing effect of the social security system) and 6.1% in the youngest cohort, 
implying still only a quarter of the total effect. This decrease comes from the 
increasing contribution rate and the regressive nature of the contributions. 
An examination of the various subgroups yields the following. The 
equalizing effect appears to be considerably larger (8 to 10 percentage 
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points) for women than for men. The A O W  equalizes income most among 
separated women and, slightly less, among married women, with the 
exception of women in the youngest cohort,  where the married women's  
income is equalized most by the AOW. Single and separated men show a 
small redistributive effect. The effect of the A O W  on income distribution is, 
for single men in the youngest cohort,  even positive, which means that it 
enlarges income inequality within this group. However,  it does not sig- 
nificantly differ from zero. The same holds for the equalizing effect for 
single men in the cohorts 1930 and 1950, and separated men in the youngest 
cohort .  
The redistributive impact of the A O W  is particularly large for nonworkers 
and self-employed persons, and is the lowest for civil servants. The 
redistributive impact is significantly positive for male civil servants in the 
youngest cohort,  whereas it does not differ significantly from zero for male 
civil servants in cohort  1950 and for self-employed men in the two youngest 
cohorts. 
The  effect is rather small for childless persons, with the exception of the 
oldest cohort.  The differences between households with children are 
smaller, but the redistributive effect is generally higher, the larger the 
number  of children. With respect to educational groups, those who have 
reached the first stage of secondary general education, senior vocational 
training or vocational colleges receive on average the greatest impact, with 
the lowest effect for those with a university degree. 
The third element,  with respect to the redistributional impact of the social 
security system, is the contribution of the various social security benefits and 
premium payments towards equivalent lifetime income per decile. This is 
shown in Fig. 2 for the AOW, whereas the net benefits for the combined 
social insurance schemes are given in Table 7. The deciles are determined 
on the basis of the employers '  gross wages. In interpreting this figure and 
table, note that the contributions paid within a year and the benefits 
received within a year are adjusted for household composition. For pension 
schemes, for example, this implies that the equivalent contributions are 
generally lower than are the nonadjusted premiums, whereas the equivalent 
benefits are sometimes higher than the nonadjusted benefits. This means 
that pension premiums have been paid during a period in which the cohort 's  
average household size is proportionally large, whereas benefits have been 
received during a period in which the average cohort 's  household size is 
proport ionally low. 
A O W  benefits are almost equally distributed over the deciles. Only the 
first decile, which contains a greater proportion of people who die at a 
young age, gets a somewhat smaller average benefit. On the other  hand, the 
contributions increase, the higher the decile is. This results in a smaller net 
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Table 7 
Net equivalent benefits (in thousands of Dfl., 1990 prices) by decile (ranked on the basis of 
equivalent before-tax income); the net A O W  benefit as a percentage of lifetime wages is in 
parentheses 
1930 of which 1940 of which 
Decile AO~/V AOW 
1 622 237(28) 659 203 (20) 
2 605 261 (18) 599 210 (12) 
3 569 243 (13) 543 202 (9) 
4 516 222 (10) 498 195 (8) 
5 402 204 (8) 457 171 (6) 
6 420 199 (7) 385 157(5) 
7 370 185 (5) 352 140(4) 
8 286 176(4) 282 121 (3) 
9 281 149 (3) 189 102 (2) 
10 74 130(2) - 12  55 (1) 
1950 of which 1960 of which 
AOW AOW 
1 484 119 (14) 602 103 (10) 
2 583 156 (8) 576 99 (5) 
3 525 138 (6) 493 82(3) 
4 394 127(4) 371 55 (2) 
5 383 92 (3) 328 35 (1) 
6 291 80(2) 231 15~0) 
7 208 57(1) 130 -23  ( - 1 )  
8 184 45 (1) 95 -25  ( - 1 )  
9 70 17 (0) - 18  -61  ( - 1 )  
10 - 82  - 15  ( - 0 )  -209 - 9 9  ( - 1 )  
generally smaller, the higher is the decile number. Fig. 2 also clearly shows 
the decreasing net benefit, the younger the cohort is. A net loss for the 
highest decile in cohort 1950 can be found, as well as for the deciles 7 up to 
and including 10 in the youngest cohort. 
Table 7 shows the net lifetime social security benefits and the net lifetime 
AOW benefits by decile. Clearly, the net effect of the social security system 
for all deciles diminishes with time. The only exceptionis decile 1 in the 
youngest cohort. This group is better off than the same group in the 
preceding generation. The social security system raises the income of decile 
1 in cohort 1930 by about 74% of the employer's gross wages. The increase 
for decile 5 amounts to only 15%, for decile 9 almost 6% and for the highest 
decile the gain from the social security system amounts to 1%. The AOW 
always forms a large part of this gain. Next follow the figures for the net 
benefit in the youngest cohort. Decile 1 again receives a proportionally 
larger gain from the system, namely 60% (in terms of the employers' gross 
wage), but for the other deciles the effect of the social security system is 
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ra ther  limited. The income after social security for decile 5 is only 10% 
higher than before social security. Deciles 9 and 10 suffer a loss, which 
amounts  to almost 3% of the gross wage for decile 10. The significance, 
however ,  of the A O W  diminishes or even has a negative impact on the net 
gain. 
With respect to the benef i t - tax  ratio, note the following (see Table 8): for 
all social insurances together  (with the exception of health insurances) the 
benef i t - t ax  ratio decreases. For cohort  1930, this benef i t - tax  ratio amounts  
to 1.91, for 1940 1.67, for 1950 1.38 and for 1960 1.27. This means that the 
cohort  1930 gets Dfl. 1.918 for each Dutch guilder invested in the social 
security system, so that the net gain amounts  to 91%, in comparison with 
the fact that for cohort  1960, the net gain is only 27%. The largest reduction 
takes place between cohorts 1940 and 1950, with a decrease of 17%. 
Cohor ts  1940 and 1960 are confronted with a decrease of  13% and 8%, 
respectively, compared  with their preceding cohort.  
This decline is reflected in the development  in the benef i t - tax  ratio for the 
various schemes. The  benef i t - tax  ratio for the A O W  declines, the younger  
the cohort  is, and the decline is steep: 20% or even more  between successive 
cohorts.  In the case of cohort  1960, the benef i t - tax  ratio for the A O W  is 
52% lower than for cohort  1930. The latter receives 2.19 times the 
p remiums  paid, whereas the former  receives only 6% more  than the 
contributions (the benef i t - tax  ratio amounts  to 1.06). For  the other two 
cohorts ,  the ratio for the A O W  is 1.75 (cohort 1940) and 1.31 (cohort 1950), 
respectively. The benef i t - tax  ratio is, of  course, considerably higher for 
women  than for men.  The benef i t - tax  ratio for cohort 1930 amounts  to 1.53 
Table 8 
Benefit-tax ratios (based on equivalent income 
on the basis of equivalent before-tax income) 
component~ for the AOW by decile (ranked 
Decile 1930 1940 1950 1960 
1 4.12 3.01 2.15 1.68 
2 3.35 2.39 1.81 1.41 
3 2.81 2.19 1.62 1.29 
4 2.49 2.04 1.49 1.18 
5 2.24 1.82 1.35 1.11 
6 2.11 1.71 1.29 1.04 
7 1.96 1.60 1.19 0.94 
8 1.85 1.48 1.14 0.93 
9 1.67 1.38 1.05 0.85 
10 1.53 1.19 0.96 0.78 
All 2.19 1.75 1.31 1.06 
8 Notice that this figure refers to discounted equivalent amounts. 
446 J.H.M. Nelissen / Journal of  Public Economics 58 (1995) 429-451 
for men,  but is 3.00 for women. For the youngest cohort the figures are 1.32 
for women and 0.83 for men. This implies that in the course of time the 
difference diminishes. This can be largely explained by the increasing 
labour-force participation of women, which implies that they contribute 
more than they have in the past. Within the two aforementioned groups, 
married men and single women show the highest yield. Separated persons 
show a somewhat lower profit, but the differences are small. Single men in 
the two youngest cohorts have a benefi t - tax ratio significantly below 1.00 
(which implies that they suffer a net loss from the scheme). This also holds 
true for married and separated men in the youngest cohort. 
The  benef i t - tax ratio for the AOW is the highest for nonworkers and the 
lowest for civil servants. The differences, however, are rather small. Only 
male nonworkers  have a proportionally higher ratio than do other  male 
groups. Male nonworkers are also the only group, among men, with a 
benef i t - tax  ratio significantly above 1.00 in the youngest cohort. Male 
employees and civil servants also have a ratio which is significantly below 
1.00 in cohort  1940. The ratio is larger, the higher the number of children. 
The  benef i t - tax  ratio is the lowest for persons with a university degree. And 
those with a certificate from vocational colleges also have a ratio that is 
below average. The other  educational groups show about an equal benefi t -  
tax ratio, although for those with a certificate from junior vocational training 
the ratio is also rather small. 
The  benef i t - tax ratios for the various deciles are given in Table 8. The 
proport ion between the first and tenth decile is smaller, the younger the 
cohort .  It amounts to 2.69 for cohort 1930 and to 2.15 for the youngest 
cohort ,  which is another  indication of the smaller redistributive impact of 
the A O W  over time. 
5. Nonequivalent income streams 
The  use of equivalent income yields, of course, other results in com- 
parison with an analysis based on nonequivalent income streams. Moreover ,  
intra-personal,  intra-cohort and intergenerational transfers cannot be mea- 
sured via equivalent income streams. This section will therefore briefly go 
into the differences, with respect to the results, and show the (discounted) 
lifetime intra-personal, intra-cohort and intergenerational money transfers. 
If income via equivalence scales is not standardized, the proport ion of the 
A O W  in net benefits increases to about half of total net benefits for all four 
cohorts. Moreover ,  the younger the cohort is, the lower its net benefit 
becomes,  but the decline is smaller than in the case of equivalent income. 
The redistributive impact is considerably larger: the Theil coefficient for 
gross wages including net A O W  benefits is 27% lower than the Theil 
coefficient for gross lifetime wages in cohort 1930 (against 13% in the case of 
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equivalent  income).  For cohort  1960, the figure is 18% against 6%. For 
males the difference is small, but women show a considerably larger 
redistribution. This is, of  course, due to their relatively low lifetime wage 
income.  As for the benef i t - tax  ratio, the picture between nonequivalent  and 
equivalent  income differs little: in both cases the ratio for the youngest  
cohort  (1960) is about  half the value of the oldest one. The level is about  
25% higher in the case of nonequivalent  income. The picture for subgroups,  
with regard to the benefit and the benef i t - tax ratio, does not deviate in 
direction. All in all, the use of equivalent income streams results in a lower 
income inequality, but also in smaller redistributions in comparison with 
nonequivalent  income streams. This has also been observed in annual data 
(see Nelissen, 1995). 
The  intra-personal ,  intra-cohort  and intergenerational transfers on the 
basis of  nonequivalent  income streams are given in Table 9. Contributions 
are higher, the younger  the cohort is, but benefits stay rather  constant. 
Thus,  the net benefit decreases and, consequently,  so do the intergenera- 
tional transfers paid by the cohorts born about  1970 and later. Moreover ,  
intra-cohort  (or intragenerational)  transfers 9 are limited, but on the rise due 
to the fact that the younger  the cohort is the higher the contributions have 
been and the higher the probabili ty that an intragenerational transfer can 
occur. The main part  of the net result stems from intergenerational 
transfers.  An important  observat ion is that intra-personal transfers form a 
growing part  of  total benefit (28% in cohort 1930 against 51% in cohort  
1960). The reason for this is, of  course, the rising contribution rate. Older  
cohorts  have been able to profit f rom circumstances that the current way of 
financing (PAYE) was, until recently, efficient (in view of the Aaron  
condition). For the younger  cohorts,  the reverse is true. At  the moment ,  the 
contr ibution rate lies just above the level that would hold for the situation of 
a capital reserve system (being about  13.5%; see Nelissen, 1987). This 
largely explains the decreasing redistributive impact of the A O W  in the 
Netherlands.  
6. Conclusions and evaluation 
This paper  explores the lifetime redistributional effects of the Dutch 
Genera l  Old-Age State Pension (AOW),  using a dynamic cross-sectional 
microsimulat ion model.  The large role the A O W  plays in the Dutch social 
9 We speak of an intra-cohort transfer if the lifetime benefits for an individual are smaller 
than his/her lifetime contributions. The intra-cohort transfer equals the difference between 
both. What remains has been considered as an intrapersonal transfer. The same holds for the 
contribution if lifetime contributions are smaller than the lifetime benefits. The intracohort 
transfers are redistributed over the deciles as a benefit according to total benefits. 
448 J.H.M. Nelissen / Journal of  Public Economics 58 (1995) 429-451 
s e c u r i t y  s y s t e m  h a s  c l e a r l y  b e e n  i l l u s t r a t e d  in  T a b l e  4. T h e  A O W  c o n t r i b u -  
t i o n s  a c c o u n t  f o r  2 8 . 6 %  ( c o h o r t  1930)  t o  3 3 . 8 %  ( c o h o r t  1960)  o f  al l  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  T h e  p e r c e n t a g e s  f o r  t h e  A O W  b e n e f i t s  a r e  3 6 . 5 %  
a n d  2 7 . 3 % ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h e s e  l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n s  a r e  a l so  r e f l e c t e d  in  t h e  
p r o p o r t i o n a l  s ize  o f  t h e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  i m p a c t  ( T a b l e  6) .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  n e t  
A O W  b e n e f i t  is d e c l i n i n g  r a p i d l y  a n d  so ,  t o o ,  is t h e  n e t  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  
i m p a c t .  A l l  in  al l ,  t h e  l i f e t i m e  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  i m p a c t  is r a t h e r  s m a l l ,  v a r y i n g  
Table 9 
Nonequivalent intra-personal, intra-cohort and intergenerational AOW 
the basis of equivalent before-tax income) 
transfers (ranked on 
Decile Contributions Benefits Net result 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Cohort1930 
1 33 26 7 185 26 17 142 152 10 142 
2 49 33 10 208 39 20 149 159 10 149 
3 57 43 14 216 43 20 153 159 6 153 
4 74 59 15 228 59 22 147 154 7 147 
5 89 67 22 230 67 22 141 141 0 141 
6 90 71 19 201 71 19 111 111 0 111 
7 88 63 25 195 63 18 114 107 - 7  114 
8 93 69 24 228 69 22 137 135 - 2  137 
9 107 77 30 242 77 23 142 135 - 7  142 
10 123 88 35 197 88 19 90 74 - 1 6  90 
Cohort 1940 
1 47 35 12 184 35 24 125 137 12 125 
2 69 55 14 224 55 30 139 155 16 139 
3 80 56 24 218 56 29 133 138 5 133 
4 93 70 23 226 70 30 126 133 7 126 
5 97 71 26 224 71 30 123 127 4 123 
6 107 80 27 201 80 27 94 94 0 94 
7 131 98 33 205 98 27 80 74 - 6  80 
8 128 98 30 236 98 31 107 108 1 107 
9 137 95 42 209 95 28 86 72 - 1 4  86 
10 155 103 52 205 103 27 75 50 -25  75 
Cohort 1950 
1 48 36 12 137 36 24 77 89 12 77 
2 89 68 21 220 68 39 113 131 18 113 
3 104 78 26 223 78 40 105 119 14 105 
4 114 84 30 206 84 37 85 92 7 85 
5 122 91 31 212 91 38 83 90 7 83 
6 139 103 36 207 103 37 67 68 1 67 
7 145 102 43 217 102 38 77 72 - 5  77 
8 157 100 57 200 100 35 65 43 - 2 2  65 
9 163 111 52 207 111 37 59 44 -15  59 
10 179 125 54 212 125 38 49 33 - 1 6  49 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
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Decile Contributions Benefits Net result 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Cohort 1960 
1 61 45 16 151 45 32 74 90 16 74 
2 110 83 27 229 83 49 97 119 22 97 
3 128 94 34 219 94 47 78 91 13 78 
4 132 97 35 225 97 48 80 93 13 80 
5 154 105 49 218 105 47 66 64 - 2  66 
6 165 122 43 213 122 46 45 48 3 45 
7 168 117 51 216 117 46 53 48 - 5  53 
8 187 130 57 220 130 47 43 33 -10 43 
9 196 125 71 200 125 43 32 4 -28 32 
10 215 147 68 207 147 44 16 - 8  -24 16 
(a) total contributions 
(b) intra-personal transfers (=self-financed) 
(c) intra-cohort transfers (c) = (a)-(b) 
(d) total benefits 
(e) intra-personal transfers (=self-financed) 
(f) intra-cohort transfers (f) = (E (c)/E(d))*(d) 
(g) intergenerational transfers (g) = (d)-(e)-(f) 
(h) net AOW result (h) = (d)-(a) 
(i) of which intra-cohort (i) = (f)-(c) and 
(j) intergenerational (j) = (g) 
f r o m  a dec l ine  in the  The i l  coeff ic ient  o f  13.0% for  the  o ldes t  coho r t  to 
6 . 8 %  for  the  y o u n g e s t  cohor t .  This  impl ies  tha t  the  l i fe t ime  r ed i s t r ibu t ive  
i m p a c t  o f  the  A O W  is c o n s i d e r a b l y  sma l l e r  t han  its effect  on  a yea r ly  basis .  
F o r  the  l a t t e r ,  we f o u n d  a r ed i s t r ibu t ive  impac t  o f  40% (Muffe l s  et  a l . ,  
1986). T h e  r e a s o n  for  this smal l  l i fe t ime red i s t r ibu t ive  impac t  l ies in the  fact  
t ha t  t he  r ed i s t r i bu t ive  effect  o f  the  A O W  benef i t s  is neu t r a l i z ed  by  the  
r eg res s ive  n a t u r e  o f  the  con t r i bu t ions ,  which  have  b e e n  pa id  du r ing  w ork ing  
life.  This  ef fec t  is s t ronge r ,  due  to the  h igher  p r e m i u m  p e r c e n t a g e s ,  the  
y o u n g e r  the  c o h o r t  is. O n e  c o n s e q u e n c e  is a g rowing  p r o p o r t i o n  of  in t ra-  
p e r s o n a l  t ransfers .  
W i t h  r e spec t  to ho r i zon t a l  r ed i s t r i bu t i on ,  the  A O W  red i s t r i bu t e s  i n c o m e  
f r o m  single  ma les ,  s e p a r a t e d  pe r sons ,  civil se rvants ,  s e l f - e m p l o y e d  pe r sons ,  
h o u s e h o l d s  wi th  few ch i ld ren  and  h i g h e r - e d u c a t e d  pe r sons  t o  m a r r i e d  and  
s ingle  f ema le s ,  m a r r i e d  m e n ,  n o n w o r k e r s ,  h o u s e h o l d s  wi th  m a n y  ch i ld ren  
and  the  l o w e r - e d u c a t e d  g roups .  T h e s e  r ed i s t r i bu t ions  can be  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
(see  T a b l e  5) ,  which  impl ies  tha t  the  ho r i zon ta l  r ed i s t r i bu t i ona l  impac t  on  
l i f e t ime  i nequa l i t y  can  be  r a t h e r  la rge  in c o m p a r i s o n  with  the  ver t ica l  
impac t .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  the  ne t  r ed i s t r ibu t ive  impac t  of  the  A O W  for  
s e p a r a t e d  w o m e n  and  f ema le  e m p l o y e e s  in the  younges t  coho r t  is of  a b o u t  
t he  s a m e  m a g n i t u d e  as tha t  for  the  c o m p l e t e  g e n e r a t i o n  of  1930, w h e r e a s  
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the effect for married women, self-employed women and persons with a 
certificate from senior vocational training is only a bit smaller. But, 
redistributive impact for the lifetime approach remains rather limited as 
compared to the period approach. 
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